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 A Wavelength for Every Network
 Synchronous Broadcasting and National Radio
 in the United States, 1926-1932
 MICHAEL J. SOCOLOW
 Today he is remembered as the "father of Silicon Valley."1 But before he in-
 troduced David Packard to William Hewlett and before being named pro-
 vost of Stanford University, Frederick Terman was a prodigy in the field of
 radio engineering. On 20 March 1929, the twenty-eight-year-old Stanford
 University engineering professor offered the San Francisco section of the
 Institute of Radio Engineers a revolutionary vision for American broad-
 casting. Terman explained how tests of a new system - called isochronous,
 or "synchronous," broadcasting - made feasible a network radio structure
 in which "30 chains averaging 100 stations each might put 30 programs
 within reach of practically every listener in the country." The problem of
 regulating broadcast licenses would be significantly eased; in fact, Terman
 concluded that "the ultimate problem of broadcasting may be to find
 enough stations to fill up the chains."2
 Simply stated, synchronous broadcasting is the process of precisely syn-
 chronizing the transmission of identical wavelengths by two or more
 broadcast transmitters. By 1929, the system had already been proven effec-
 tive, as stations WBZ and WBZA in Massachusetts both broadcast at 990
 kilocycles without significant interference problems. Terman and others
 envisioned a national system in which any prospective network could be as-
 signed a wavelength, and with proper application of the synchronous tech-
 Michael J. Socolow is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication and
 Journalism at the University of Maine. His scholarship focuses on issues of competition
 in the first two decades of national broadcasting.
 ©2008 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved.
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 1. Stuart W. Leslie and Robert H. Kargon, "Selling Silicon Valley: Frederick Terman's
 Model for Regional Advantage" Business History Review 70 (1996): 435-72.
 2. Frederick Emmons Terman, Some Possibilities of Intelligence Transmission
 When Using a Limited Band of Frequencies," Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engi-
 neers 18 (January 1930): 167.
 89
This content downloaded from 130.111.46.54 on Tue, 07 Jun 2016 21:28:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE
 JANUARY
 2008
 VOL. 49
 nique, that network's signal would be transmitted by multiple outlets across
 the nation. Under such a system, radio listeners anywhere within the coun-
 try might find one of the National Broadcasting Company's (NBC) two
 networks at 660 kilocycles, or the Columbia Broadcasting System's (CBS)
 network at 880 kilocycles. By freeing up the numerous wavelengths em-
 ployed for network radio, significantly more broadcasters - at the local, re-
 gional, and national levels - could be accommodated.
 Synchronous broadcasting was not simply a futuristic vision. By the
 end of 1930, NBC's general engineer acknowledged its technical feasibility.
 Elsewhere, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) began experimen-
 tal synchronization in 1926, and German and Swedish broadcasters started
 using the system in 1930.3 In the U.S. context, the synchronous system (also
 called "synchronization") promised to alleviate tensions caused by the
 rapid expansion of NBC and CBS during the late 1920s and early 1930s.
 One such issue, regularly brought to the attention of regulators and politi-
 cians by irate radio listeners, was "program duplication." As the networks
 expanded, national programming transmitted by multiple stations on sev-
 eral different wavelengths seemed to diminish the diversity of program-
 ming on U.S. airwaves. Program duplication joined other contentious de-
 bates emerging in broadcasting's earliest era, including discussions of
 advertising on the airwaves and the apparent favoritism toward commercial
 broadcasters shown by federal regulators.
 These disputes testify to the vitality of early public debate over broad-
 casting's influence on American society. Radio's revolutionary characteris-
 tics - its creation of a new public sphere, a social arena both massively
 public and intimately personal - required novel policy considerations. Poli-
 ticians, broadcasters, critics, regulators, and engineers all wrestled with
 broadcasting's role in the U.S. context. Issues such as the proper mode of
 regulation, applicable technical specifications, the acceptability of advertis-
 ing, the boundaries of speech, and the optimal number of broadcasters were
 deeply intertwined; no single aspect of broadcasting could be addressed in
 isolation. Broadcasting, from its birth, stood athwart a nexus of technolog-
 ical, cultural, political, and social considerations.4
 3. C. W. Horn, "The Importance of Phase Control in Synchronizing," Electronics,
 December 1930, 423; "NBC Admits Practicability of Synchronizing," Electronics, Novem-
 ber 1930, 364; L. McC. Young, "Present Practice in the Synchronous Operation of Broad-
 cast Stations as Exemplified by WBBM and KFAB," Proceedings of the Institute of Radio
 Engineers 21 (1936): 438-39.
 4. Robert J. Brown, Manipulating the Ether: The Power of Broadcast Radio in Thirties
 America (Jefferson, N.C., 1998); Douglas B. Craig, Fireside Politics: Radio and Political
 Culture in the United States, 1920-1940 (Baltimore, 2000); Michele Hilmes, Radio Voices:
 American Broadcasting, 1922-1952 (Minneapolis, 1997); Bruce Lenthall, Radio's America:
 The Great Depression and the Rise of Modern Mass Culture (Chicago, 2007); Jason Lovig-
 lio, Radio's Intimate Public: Network Broadcasting and Mass-Mediated Democracy (Min-
 neapolis, 2005); Edward D. Miller, Emergency Broadcasting and 1930s American Radio
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 Synchronous broadcasting promised to reframe much of the debate. It
 addressed the issue of spectrum scarcity by offering the possibility of sig-
 nificantly more broadcast stations. By allowing more broadcasters on the
 air, synchronization would foster a more competitive broadcasting envi-
 ronment and provide the national audience an opportunity for more di-
 verse programming. More effective exploitation of the broadcast spectrum
 had the potential to ease tensions surrounding federal regulation and
 licensing. While not completely solving the scarcity problem (for example,
 it would not allow an unlimited number of broadcasters), synchronous
 broadcasting provided a promising technical alternative to the status quo
 during the first two decades of U.S. broadcasting. Politicians, members of
 the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), and a sizable subset of the broad-
 casting community recognized its potential and enthusiastically embraced
 its democratic promise. In fact, the first regulation of network broadcasting
 in U.S. history was the commission's attempt, in 1929, to enforce synchro-
 nization. The industry press and the commercial networks - CBS and
 NBC - strongly opposed implementation of the system. By offering a more
 competitive marketplace in national broadcasting, synchronization threat-
 ened the commercial viability of the nascent network duopoly.
 In a direct challenge to the deterministic and evolutionary narratives
 that have proliferated in the field, scholars of technology have increasingly
 emphasized failure at the center of historical inquiry.5 The failure to adopt
 synchronous broadcasting forces us to reconsider the scope of the earliest
 debates regarding American radio. Although the synchronization debate
 and the reform movement were catalyzed by similar anxieties, including
 fears about monopolization of the airwaves, homogenization and commer-
 cialization of culture, and corporations controlling speech on the public
 airwaves, the radio engineering community and the reformers failed to col-
 laborate in promoting synchronous broadcasting. This article explores the
 reasons why synchronous broadcasting, despite its technical feasibility and
 social promise, never became a serious alternative to the status quo.
 The public debate over synchronous broadcasting consisted of two
 related discussions. The first concerned the technical viability of the system;
 the second, which commenced shortly before viability was established, con-
 cerned economic and regulatory issues of implementation. Much of the
 first discussion can be reconstructed by referencing contemporaneous re-
 ports in the technical literature, but any scholar attempting to recount the
 second one faces archival obstacles. While the public record (including
 (Philadelphia, 2003); Hugh Richard Slotten, Radio and Television Regulation (Baltimore,
 2000), esp. 43-67.
 5. Kenneth Lipartito, "Picturephone and the Information Age: The Social Meaning
 of Failure," Technology and Culture 44 (2003): 52-58; John M. Staudenmaier, S.J., "Ra-
 tionality, Agency, Contingency: Recent Trends in the History of Technology," Reviews in
 American History 30 (2002): 168-81.
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 press accounts, congressional testimony and debates, reports of the FRC,
 and other sources) is voluminous, there exist few archival sources related to
 synchronization. The NBC collections at both the Library of Congress and
 the Wisconsin Historical Society are not comprehensive and possess mini-
 mal engineering material from before 1935. Other evidence suggests that
 after synchronization's rejection as a national broadcasting system, NBC's
 engineers thought little of it. When NBC vice president and chief engineer
 O. B. Hanson recounted the history of NBC's engineering department
 before a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) hearing in Novem-
 ber 1938, synchronization was barely mentioned. Hanson's testimony re-
 quired almost ninety pages of text, of which synchronous broadcasting
 occupied less than one paragraph.6 The Radio Corporation of America
 (RCA) collection, housed in the Hagley Museum and Library, does not
 contain materials referencing synchronization during this period.7 Most of
 the material related to synchronization in the FRC collection at the Nation-
 al Archives is recapitulated in the commission's annual reports. While such
 archival obstacles have undoubtedly hindered historical examination of
 this subject, the contemporaneous technical sources, selected archival
 material, and records of public debate are clearly rich enough to recon-
 struct discussions of synchronization.
 This article's recounting of the synchronization debate can be contex-
 tualized within the revisionist scholarship emphasizing conflict in the early
 negotiations over the social construction of U.S. broadcasting. Robert Mc-
 Chesney, Thomas Streeter, and others have chronicled the commercial
 broadcasting industry's efforts to obscure public dispute and propagate a
 narrative of ideological harmony in accounts of the evolution of the U.S.
 system of broadcasting. Similarly, Susan Smulyan has shown how debates
 concerning applicable technologies for national broadcasting were con-
 stricted by AT&T and RCA.8 Synchronization was not the only alternative
 national broadcasting technology that the networks derailed by using their
 political, economic, and social leverage; the widespread use of electrical
 transcriptions and, after 1935, frequency modulation (FM) were also
 severely hampered by network efforts.9
 6. Testimony of O. B. Hanson, Federal Communications Commission Docket No.
 5060, 710-99.
 7. Personal communication with Marjorie McNinch, Reference Archivist, Manu-
 scripts and Archives Department, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware,
 19 June 2007.
 8. Robert W. McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, & Democracy (New York,
 1993); Thomas Streeter, Selling the Air: A Critique of the Policy of Commercial Broadcasting
 in the United States (Chicago, 1996); Craig; Kathy M. Newman, Radio Active: Advertising
 and Consumer Activism, 1935-1947 (Berkeley, Calif., 2004); Susan Smulyan, Selling Radio:
 The Commercialization of American Broadcasting, 1920-1934 (Washington, D.C., 1994),
 11-64.
 9. On electrical transcriptions, see Alexander Todd Russo, "Defensive Transcriptions:
 92
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 The synchronization story also supports the scholarship of economists
 like Nobel laureate Ronald Coase, who question spectrum scarcity's valid-
 ity as the basis for U.S. broadcast regulation. Spectrum scarcity was not
 simply an established, neutral, scientific fact: by providing the scientific
 rationale for discriminatory action, it privileged proponents of the regula-
 tory system as it developed.10 The prime benefit of synchronization was its
 ability to create a far more effective exploitation of the broadcast spectrum.
 The failure of the FRC to implement a system addressing the major physi-
 cal limitation on U.S. broadcasting attests to spectrum scarcity's political
 and economic value to the commercial broadcasting community.
 Synchronization threatened chaos for the carefully rationalized U.S.
 broadcasting marketplace. As this article will show, synchronization was
 technically feasible though economically unpalatable for the networks and
 much of the commercial broadcasting community. Public criticism of CBS
 and NBC created the initial pressure to adopt the system. But when the lis-
 tening audience's dissatisfaction with the radio chains lessened during the
 early 1930s, demands for the networks and the FRC to institute synchro-
 nization ceased. Fears of corporate monopolization of the airwaves dissi-
 pated as the U.S. audience grew fond of its national network program-
 ming. Discussions of synchronization would continue in the technical
 literature, but wider public discussion essentially vanished from the his-
 torical record.
 Synchronous Broadcasting's Technological Development
 The technical feasibility of synchronous broadcasting began with the
 development of the piezo-electric crystal oscillator, an important though
 too-often-overlooked moment in the early history of broadcasting.11 The
 Radio Networks, Sound-on-Disc Recording, and the Meaning of Live Broadcasting," The
 Velvet Light Trap 54 (2004): 4-17, and "Roots of Radio's Rebirth: Audiences, Aesthetics,
 Economics, and Technologies of American Broadcasting, 1926-1951" (Ph.D. diss.,
 Brown University, 2004). On FM, see Don V. Erickson, Armstrong's Fight for FM Broad-
 casting: One Man vs. Big Business and Bureaucracy (Montgomery, Ala., 1973); Lawrence
 Lessing, Man of High Fidelity (Philadelphia, 1956); and Tom Lewis, Empire of the Air: The
 Men Who Made Radio (New York, 1991).
 10. Ronald H. Coase, "The Federal Communications Commission," Journal of Law &
 Economics 2 (1959): 1-40; Ronald H. Coase and Nicholas Johnson, "Should the FCC Be
 Abolished?" in Regulation, Economics, and the Law, ed. Bernard H. Siegan (Lexington,
 Mass., 1979), 47-53; Thomas W. Hazlett, "Liberalizing U.S. Spectrum Allocation," Tele-
 communications Policy 27 (2003): 485-99; David Moss and Michael R. Fein, "Radio
 Regulation Revisited: Coase, the FCC, and the Public Interest," Journal of Policy History 15
 (2003): 389-416; Louise Benjamin, Freedom of the Air and the Public Interest: First
 Amendment Rights in Broadcasting to 1935 (Carbondale, 111., 2001), 203-25; McChesney,
 239-51.
 1 1 . Young (n. 3 above), 433; S. R. Winters and Geo. S. Turner, "When the Magic Crys-
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 crystal's ability to offer far greater stability in the operating frequencies of
 radio transmitters significantly reduced heterodyne interference (static) and
 dramatically improved radio's tonal fidelity. Discussing the reduction of het-
 erodyne interference in the mid- 1920s, a key AT&T engineer noted that there
 existed "no single contribution to this important problem so effective as the
 development of the piezo-electric crystal for use at radio frequencies."12
 The remarkable stability of the piezo crystal oscillator inspired engineers
 to explore the possibility of precisely synching multiple transmitters. Regular
 chain, or network, broadcasting had only recently commenced, and testing
 effective methods of national coverage inspired the first synchronous exper-
 iments. Between 1923 and 1926, Frank Conrad, Frank Falknor, Walter Evans,
 and other Westinghouse engineers sought to create just such a system.13 The
 WJZ radio chain, formed by Westinghouse, RCA, and General Electric (GE)
 (known collectively as the Radio Group), had been denied access to AT&T
 telephone lines for the interconnection of broadcast stations. Embroiled in a
 contentious patent dispute, executives of both the Radio Group and the tele-
 phone company realized that the future of nation-al broadcasting hinged
 upon the ruling of an independent arbitrator en-gaged to settle the myriad
 issues involved. While awaiting the arbitrator's decision, the Westinghouse
 team began exploring technological alternatives to using dedicated AT&T
 lines. They experimented with shortwave relay by transmitting programs
 from Pittsburgh to Chicago, where the signal was then converted to a stan-
 dard broadcast frequency for re-broadcasting. This shortwave relay system
 was prone to selective fading and distortion, however, and this prompted a
 search for an alternative relay system.14 Conrad theorized that isochronous
 broadcasting could resolve several of the problems inherent in shortwave sig-
 nal conversion. "The stations would operate simultaneously carrying identi-
 cal programs, tied together by ... radio link," Evans later remembered.
 Conrad's approach to synchronizing the waves was relatively simple: he
 would transmit a low- frequency tone generated by a tuning fork at one sta-
 tion, and at each of the synchronizing stations the audio tone from the tun-
 ing fork would be "multiplied up by means of suitable multi-vibrator cir-
 tal Becomes the Magic Carpet," Radio Age, July 1926, 17; Paul Shubert, The Electric Word
 (New York, 1928), 290.
 12. Laurens E. Whittemore, "The Development of Radio," Annals of the American
 Academy of Political and Social Science 142 (1929): 4.
 13. A history of synchronization published in 1935 stated that Conrad first sug-
 gested the idea in 1924, while Falknor began the installation of the first system in January
 1926; see Young, 433. See also Ann Graban Crawford, "A Universal Speaking Service: The
 Role of Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company in the Development of Na-
 tional Network Broadcasting, 1922-1926," Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 51
 (2007): 516-29.
 14. "The Reminiscences of Donald G. Little," Radio Pioneers Project, Oral History Re-
 search Office, Columbia University, New York (hereafter RPP), 35-36; Smulyan (n. 8
 above), 48-52.
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 cuits to the assigned frequency of the station so that the carrier waves of
 both stations were held in complete synchronism"15 The initial experi-
 ments were promising, but testing had barely begun when the motivating
 force behind Westinghouse's relay work vanished. The arbiter's ruling re-
 sulted in the creation of the National Broadcasting Company in 1926; this,
 the nation's sole network, would be owned by the Radio Group but would
 use only leased AT&T lines for station interconnection.16
 The development of NBC did not, however, stop technical experimen-
 tation in synchronous broadcasting. Just a few months before NBC's debut,
 two Westinghouse stations in Massachusetts started to synchronize their
 signals: WBZ in Boston and WBZA in Springfield began experimentally
 transmitting with the same frequency - 900 kilocycles.17 The early tests
 proved remarkably successful; within weeks, the two stations established a
 permanent isochronous link that could have served as a national model.
 Radio Broadcast applauded the result, noting that "the release of many
 wavelengths" would occur if such synchronization was applied to network
 broadcasting. Throughout the synchronization debates, the successful
 WBZ-WBZA example highlighted the weakness of the argument for rejec-
 tion on technical grounds.18 The stations, which were almost exactly 100
 miles apart, were connected by a dedicated, modified telephone circuit, and
 transmissions were monitored closely for heterodyne problems. The sta-
 tions did not interfere with each other - not even in their overlapping bor-
 dering zones - and the synchronized signal greatly increased the reception
 area of both without an increase in power.
 Westinghouse's synchronization was known as a "wire control" system.
 By mid- 1927, alternative isochronous control systems would be proposed
 and tested. A variation of shortwave re-broadcasting, called "shortwave con-
 trol," consisted of multiple transmitters with identical crystals converting
 and synchronizing an incoming shortwave signal. This method had yet to be
 tried and appeared quite difficult,19 requiring perfectly matched crystals
 maintained at identical temperatures. While many broadcast engineers were
 skeptical, manufacturers of crystal control apparatus assured them that they
 15. "The Reminiscences of Walter C. Evans," RPP, 41.
 16. Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the United States, vol. 1: A Tower in
 Babel (New York, 1966), 151-53.
 17. The 11 November 1928 spectrum reallocation required WBZ and WBZA to
 change their frequency to 990 kilocycles; Young (n. 3 above), 434.
 18. "Operating Two Stations on One Wavelength," Radio Broadcast, September 1926,
 374; Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company, Facts about Westinghouse Radio
 Stations WBZ-WBZA in New England, pamphlet 2648 (Pittsburgh, 1931), 6, and "Broad-
 cast Advertising in New England and New York: The WBZ-WBZA Market," in Questions
 and Answers: Broadcast Advertising, pamphlet 2704 (Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc.,
 1929), both pamphlets in the Library of American Broadcasting, University of Maryland,
 College Park.
 19. "Test Short Waves to Attune Stations," New York Times, 29 November 1927, 32.
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 could produce "crystals so accurately matched that no audible heterodyne
 interference will result between two stations so controlled." An additional
 alternative was "carrier-wave" synchronization. This system required the
 synchronizing station to set up a receiving set several miles from its trans-
 mitter, in a location conducive to capturing the carrier wave of the signal to
 be synchronized. The originating signal would then be transmitted by tele-
 phone line to the synchronizing station's control room, where it would be
 amplified and its frequency precisely synchronized before being transmit-
 ted. Because of the vagaries of reception, this method required an engineer
 to monitor and equalize the signal during the synchronization. Interestingly,
 carrier- wave synchronization did not require identical programming; if the
 synchronization was precise enough, two stations could carry two different
 programs on the same wavelength, and there would be only minimal cross-
 talk and signal interference in the bordering reception areas.20
 Successful examples of synchronous broadcasting are remarkable in
 light of the chaos that ensued in U.S. broadcasting from the fall of 1926
 until the completion of the reallocation of the spectrum in November 1928.
 "The year 1926 is still remembered as marking the low point of quality in
 radio reception," noted radio critic Dane Yorke in a 1931 American Mercury
 article.21 The decision in United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation et al.
 (1926) resulted in hundreds of new stations jamming the airwaves during
 the fall of 1926. These new broadcasters jumped into the ether, happily
 squatting on long-held wavelengths and causing bedlam - not to mention
 an enormous increase in heterodyne interference and cross-talk - across
 the spectrum. To arrest the situation, Congress passed the Federal Radio
 Act and empowered the Federal Radio Commission to begin regulation of
 the airwaves "in the public interest, convenience, and necessity."
 The Federal Radio Commission, Congress, and
 Synchronous Broadcasting
 The unregulated ether provided the immediate stimulus for the cre-
 ation of the Federal Radio Commission. But a secondary motivation, one
 cited by several skeptical legislators who voted for the Radio Act against
 their political inclinations, was that the FRC could provide an effective
 bulwark against monopolization of U.S. broadcasting. As Representative
 Ewin Davis (a Democrat from Tennessee) explained, the commissioners
 were appointed to look "after the radio situation in the interest of all the
 people and of all the users of radio and all those who are interested in it and
 the various sections of the country." Davis condemned the commission's
 20. "Five Methods for Operating Radio Chains on One Wave" New York Timesy 4
 December 1927, 14.
 21. Dane Yorke, "The Radio Octopus," American Mercury, August 1931, 392.
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 initial actions, complaining that commissioners "regarded it to be their
 duty solely ... to see how much of the air they could put in the control of
 the great radio corporations of the country."22
 Shortly after the passage of the act, Davis added an amendment requir-
 ing the equitable distribution of spectrum assignments according to geo-
 graphic zones. The rapid expansion of the radio chains, which were based in
 New York City, created the necessity for the amendment. "We want broadcast
 licenses fairly distributed in such a manner that those who desire to do so
 may listen to New York and chain stations when they want to, but may, when
 they so desire, listen to programs broadcast by stations elsewhere throughout
 the country, including their own zones, states, and cities," Davis explained.23
 The Davis Amendment (passed by both houses and signed into law)
 provided the strongest political defense of localism in broadcast history.
 Animated by a fear of cultural intrusion, the law addressed the issue of net-
 work expansion. For many radio listeners, the expansion of NBC, and, after
 1927, CBS foretold "the death of long-distance listening."24 The standard-
 ized programming transmitted by affiliates of the chains angered those who
 enjoyed the possibility of tuning in different broadcasts from Denver or
 Detroit or Boston on any given evening. The problem went by several
 names, but was commonly referred to as "program duplication." Listeners
 irritated by program duplication wrote to stations, networks, the nascent
 FRC, and, perhaps most importantly, their congressional representatives.
 Senator Alben Barkley (a Democrat from Kentucky) complained of the
 "lack of activities of the Radio Commission with respect to chain broad-
 casting stations [despite the] many protests from people in our states."
 Barkley was seconded by Senator Sam Bratton (a Democrat from New
 Mexico), who informed his colleagues that "the complaint [in New Mexico]
 is against chain broadcasting, emanating principally from New York. The
 people there do not want that broadcasting. They prefer the independent
 stations." Senator William Harris (a Democrat from Georgia) joined the
 chorus when he entered a letter from a constituent embittered by program
 duplication into the Congressional Record. Col. W. E. Simmons, an avid
 radio listener, called on Harris to abolish NBC in the forthcoming legisla-
 tive debates over radio.25
 22. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1928, 69:4243; see also Jennifer M.
 Proffitt and Michael Brown, "Regulating the Radio Monopoly: Ewin Davis and His Leg-
 islative Debates, 1923-1928," Journal of Radio Studies 11 (2004): 100-115.
 23. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1928, 3985.
 24. Barnouw (n. 16 above), 207; Clifford Doerksen, American Babel: Rogue Radio
 Broadcasters of the Jazz Age (Philadelphia, 2005), 92-104; and Derek Vaillant, "Bare-
 Knuckled Broadcasting: Enlisting Manly Respectability and Racial Paternalism in the
 Battle against Chain Stores, Chain Stations, and the Federal Radio Commission on Lou-
 isiana's KWKH, 1924-33," The Radio Journal: International Studies in Broadcast and
 Audio Media 1 (2004): 193-211.
 25. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1928, 5157, 5163-64.
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 Members of the larger broadcasting community were well aware of this
 sentiment. In a letter to the FRC, the general manager of Chicago station
 WBBM proposed one version of synchronization as the solution to pro-
 gram duplication:
 Give to each chain now in existence or which may be organized,
 a certain air channel. When a broadcast is given by the chain over
 several stations, each station should be compelled to change its
 wavelength to the wavelength of the chain's key station
 would in no way interfere with the chain broadcasts, but it would
 permit more programs. It would in fact simplify matters for the
 listeners. For instance, if the channel of the XYZ chain was 430
 meters, the listeners would always know just where to pick up the
 programs from that chain.26
 This impractical proposal - forcing stations to regularly change frequen-
 cies - would have created havoc for listener and broadcaster alike, but nev-
 ertheless provides evidence that factions within the commercial broadcast-
 ing community sought to restrict the number of wavelengths made available
 for chain programming.
 Representative Davis proved the most consistently enthusiastic pro-
 moter of synchronization throughout 1927-28. In a January 1928 hearing,
 Davis pointedly asked the chairman of the FRC, Eugene Sykes, why, if syn-
 chronization worked for WBZ and WBZA, it would not work for the entire
 network system. The chairman replied that because the system required a
 plethora of "experienced engineers and highly qualified technicians . . . the
 high cost makes the method prohibitive." The success of WBZ-WBZA
 resulted from Westinghouse's generous commitment of resources, some-
 thing that Sykes explained would not be possible to require of all chain sta-
 tions. Testifying in the same hearings, Commissioner Orestes Caldwell
 proved much more sympathetic to Davis's argument; unlike Sykes, he ad-
 mitted that "the present chain arrangement was unsatisfactory" and syn-
 chronous broadcasting offered a promising solution.27
 When the Davis Amendment appeared before the Senate in the spring
 of 1928, several senators questioned Senator Clarence Dill (a Democrat
 from Washington), the chief author of the Radio Act, about the possibility
 of synchronization. "Will placing these chain stations on one wave length
 obviate the trouble we have in the south?" asked Senator Earle Mayfield (a
 Democrat from Texas). Dill offered a confused reply. While acknowledging
 the success of WBZ and WBZA in synchronization, he deferred to the
 26. C. B. Smith to the Federal Radio Commission, reprinted in Radio Broadcast, July
 1927, 162. See also "One Wave for the Chain" Radio Digest, 1 April 1927, 8.
 27. "Says Radio Chains Got 21 of 25 Lanes," New York Times, 28 January 1928, 13;
 "Proposes to Limit Radio Chain System," New York Times, 1 February 1928, 20.
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 "engineers who have been before the committee," stating that "it has not yet
 proved practicable and feasible to broadcast chain programs on one wave-
 length." The synchronization in Massachusetts, Dill explained, was costly to
 maintain. "Those stations are connected by wires that keep them on the
 same frequency, and it would cost literally millions and millions of dollars
 to connect all of the chain stations of the country in such a way as to be able
 to do that," he concluded.28 Senator Dill undoubtedly understood (because
 he mentioned it later in the same debate) that all chain broadcasting in
 1928 was accomplished by wire connection. Thus his answer appears disin-
 genuous at best.
 The commission reacted to this pressure. In one of its first acts, it asked
 an employee of the Department of Commerce to review the over 3,000 let-
 ters received on the subject of chain broadcasting during 1926-27. "Chain
 broadcasting is either the greatest blessing or curse of broadcasting," the
 resulting report noted, stating that "the conclusion is dependent entirely
 upon either the location of the listener or his taste."29 Rural listeners in par-
 ticular complained about program duplication. In response to congres-
 sional pressure and listener complaints, Commissioner Caldwell publicly
 called for synchronization. In a speech detailing the commission's stance,
 he discussed the problems identified by engineers in the earliest testing.
 The central issue concerned the precision of the synchronized tuning appa-
 ratuses: the slightest deviations caused different types of carrier- wave inter-
 action and thus resulted in heterodynes sounding like whistles over huge
 reception areas. Yet perfect synchronization had been achieved, and further
 experimentation would undoubtedly assist in developing a method to
 more easily and cost-effectively stabilize the synchronized signals. This
 method must be discovered, Caldwell concluded, because "if stations on the
 same frequency can be accurately synchronized, it will be possible to utilize
 our present channels manifold [sic] more effectively." Caldwell directly
 connected the success of the WBZ-WBZA link to the future of chain
 broadcasting: "This plan offers an economic solution of the serious prob-
 lem of chain-program operation, where 20 to 40 channels are now some-
 times tied up with an identical program. If such chain programs could be
 limited to one or two channels, obviously many channels now tied up
 would be freed for other services."30
 The majority of the commission agreed with Caldwell and attempted to
 enforce synchronization. Federal Radio Commission General Order No. 43,
 promulgated on 8 September 1928, was the first network-broadcasting reg-
 28. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1928, 5158, 5170-71.
 29. Federal Radio Commission, Annual Report of the Federal Radio Commission
 (Washington, D.C., 1927), 8.
 30. "Address by Commissioner Caldwell on Synchronization, October 14, 1927," in
 Second Annual Report of the Federal Radio Commission, app. H (Washington, D.C.,
 1928), 221.
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 ulation of any kind in U.S. history. This order prohibited "two or more sta-
 tions [from] broadcasting the same program for more than one hour un-
 less the transmitters are more than three hundred miles apart, or the sta-
 tions are operating on the same frequency, or [unless] special permission"
 was granted by the commission.31 The 300-mile radius prohibited stations
 in Washington, D.C., Boston, and Philadelphia, for example, from carrying
 more than one hour of network programs originating in New York unless
 the multiple transmitters were "operating on the same frequency" or the
 broadcasters received special permission from the commission. General
 Order No. 43 had been originally proposed to take effect in March 1929,
 but the commission announced a delay in order to poll listeners across the
 country "to determine the public's attitude towards the proposed restric-
 tion" before making the rule effective.32
 The implementation of the order proved problematic, showing the
 commission to be unrealistic in its demands. The Radio Act did not clearly
 endow the commission with the power to enforce such a rule. The order's
 broad mandate left unclear which station retained the right to the original
 broadcast, and which station(s) acted illegally in a non-synchronized sys-
 tem. These problems led to a series of postponements of the rule; ulti-
 mately, General Order No. 43 would be rescinded in December 1929. In re-
 scinding the order, the commission claimed it needed adequate time "to
 investigate and determine whether chain programs are being unnecessarily
 duplicated, and to enable the commission to determine what progress has
 been made toward the successful operation of two or more stations on the
 same frequency in synchronism, either by wire connection or otherwise."33
 The commission's failure to enforce its chain-broadcasting order frus-
 trated its defenders in Congress, in particular angering Senator Dill. The re-
 cently completed reorganization of the radio spectrum resulted in thirty-
 eight of the nation's forty clear channels being assigned to chain-affiliated
 stations. According to Dill, this defeated the purpose of dear-channel broad-
 casting: it led to the consolidation, rather than the diversification, of pro-
 gramming on the U.S. airwaves. The commission's inaction, Dill posited,
 was the result of having too much work and too few people.34 Senator
 Robert La Follette, a Wisconsin Republican, suspected that something else
 held up enforcement. "Is there some influence preventing the commission
 from permitting that order to go into effect?" he asked Dill. "I am unable to
 31. Laurence F. Schmeckebier, The Federal Radio Commission: Its History, Activities,
 and Organization (Washington, D.C., 1932), 52.
 32. Chain Broadcasting May Be Restricted, Broadcast Advertising, May 1929, 10.
 33. "Radio Chain Order Waits," New York Times, 8 October 1928, 29; "Rescinds Old
 Order on Radio Chains," New York Times, 21 December 1929, 24. See also James C. Foust,
 Big Voices of the Air: The Battle over Clear Channel Radio (Ames, Iowa, 2000), 34.
 34. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2d sess., 1929, 70:3749, 3752.
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 answer the Senator's question as to why they continually postpone it," Dill
 responded, "but the fact is that they do, and that is the matter to which I am
 objecting."35 Responding to this pressure, Chairman Sykes announced his
 intention to put forth a new rule limiting the broadcast of chain programs
 to only one 5,000-watt (maximum) transmitter in any single state. "Why
 does the commission continuously find fault with us and our service," asked
 the exasperated NBC president, Merlin Aylesworth, "when there are 400
 small stations throughout the country that go unmolested?"36
 The commission premised the rescission of General Order No. 43 upon
 additional experiments to determine the technical feasibility of synchro-
 nous broadcasting. For these experiments, which were conducted between
 1929 and 1931, the commission required the cooperation of engineers from
 NBC, RCA, and a few powerful, commercially successful affiliates. While
 they did cooperate, ultimately the networks would successfully defend their
 established oligopoly in chain broadcasting by dismissing the promising
 results of these experiments.
 Synchronization and the Networks
 Program duplication resulted from an unsettled situation in U.S.
 broadcasting between the years 1926 and 1929. The reorganization of the
 radio spectrum under General Order No. 40 was not completed until
 November 1928. Before this reorganization, chains required multiple, often
 overlapping affiliation contracts with stations around the country in order
 to ensure adequate coverage for sponsors. In 1928, CBS signed affiliation
 agreements with three separate Chicago broadcasters, and NBC required
 five Chicago stations for its two networks.37 This inefficient system, which
 required the chains to occupy far more wavelengths than necessary, first be-
 came noticeable among most American listeners in 1927 and provoked the
 popular outcry against "monopolization of the air."
 The networks were well aware of synchronized broadcasting. WBZ and
 WBZA were NBC affiliates, and Westinghouse's engineers worked closely
 with NBC's engineers ( Westinghouse owned a minority stake in NBC at the
 time). Yet from its inception, the networks vigorously fought the idea of
 national synchronization. Publicly, they argued that the system was simply
 not technically reliable enough to ensure its successful implementation.
 They also undoubtedly harbored fears about the initial investment required
 for synchronization. During the initial debates over the system, NBC was
 35. Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st sess., 1929, 71:3836.
 36. "Protest Chain Order Proposed for Radio," New York Times, 2 November 1929, 19.
 37. John W. Spalding, "1928: Radio Becomes a Mass Medium," Journal of Broad-
 casting 8 (1963-64): 33-34.
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 still not a profitable company, and CBS would not realize its first profit
 until 1929.38 The profitability of national broadcasting was not yet a given
 before 1930, and with the advent of the Great Depression, the future of
 radio advertising was far from assured. Those calling for synchronization
 praised the enhanced competitive environment it would create; unsurpris-
 ingly, NBC and CBS were not interested in assisting the development of
 competition.
 The networks were not alone in their opposition to implementation of
 a synchronous system. Their most important affiliates joined them in re-
 sisting this putative reorganization of the spectrum. Network affiliation
 offered an important brand identity for stations in a competitive market,
 and the most successful commercial stations relied upon both network
 compensation and local advertising revenue. Synchronization would have
 forced many affiliates to choose between remittance from the national net-
 works or local advertising dollars. Because the established affiliation system
 was so technically inefficient in the redundancies it produced on the radio
 spectrum, far more stations profited than would be the case were the net-
 works to cover the nation with a series of high-powered, synchronized
 transmitters. The networks preferred this technically inefficient yet soon-
 to-be very profitable affiliation system. Both NBC and CBS owned several
 key local stations, which earned both national and local revenue in such
 important markets as Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington,
 D.C. If confined to a single national wavelength, the profits of these stations
 would have been seriously reduced.
 The networks publicly defended the system's inefficiencies by attacking
 the economic and technical viability of synchronous broadcasting. In
 February 1928, Senator Dill called NBC president Merlin Aylesworth to tes-
 tify before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee. Aylesworth had
 opposed synchronization from NBC's inception; at a meeting of NBC's
 Board of Consulting Engineers in early 1927, Aylesworth suggested that
 Westinghouse end the synchronous operation of WBZ-WBZA. Frank
 Conrad "strongly objected" and Aylesworth withdrew the proposal.39 At the
 Senate's hearings a year later, Dill asked Aylesworth why NBC, and its par-
 ent company RCA, did not pursue synchronous broadcasting more vigor-
 ously. Dill specifically questioned whether synchronous broadcasting was
 "technically possible" as of that moment. "It is technically possible," Ayles-
 worth replied, "but not technically practicable to do it." The problem,
 Aylesworth stated, was that NBC's imposition of the system on its affiliates
 would create serious problems for the chain, its partners, and advertisers
 38. Federal Communications Commission, Report on Chain Broadcasting (Washing-
 ton, D.C, 1941), 17, 24.
 39. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Board of Consulting Engineers, March 1 5,
 1927," National Broadcasting Company History Files, folder 780, Library of Congress,
 Washington, D.C.
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 wishing to use both national and local radio facilities. The system would
 turn the chains and their affiliates into adversaries, forcing them to com-
 pete for the same national advertising accounts and damaging the eco-
 nomic structure of the industry in its infancy. "A great number of inde-
 pendent stations," testified Aylesworth, "have very definitely expressed
 themselves on the point that when and if the network is put on a single
 wavelength . . . they will immediately drop the chain." Affiliated stations not
 owned by NBC such as WMAQ in Chicago would be immediately harmed
 by losing their most popular national programming, while NBC would be
 harmed by losing the prestige garnered by affiliation with Chicago's most
 important station.
 The relationship between stations and chains was symbiotic, Ayles-
 worth argued. They provided each other with economic and public-rela-
 tions benefits. "To restrict any network, whether it be the National Broad-
 casting Company, or the Columbia chain, or any other, is to wreck the only
 medium of mass distribution of programs," Aylesworth concluded. Ad-
 dressing the technical specifics of synchronization, Aylesworth reiterated
 the earlier testimony of NBC's engineers. The WBZ-WBZA wire-con-
 nected system would simply be too costly to implement, he argued. Dill
 then pressed him on the question of relay-based synchronization. He
 wanted to know specifically whether the issues being discussed were truly
 technical - or economic. "If it does develop to where they can keep the sta-
 tions accurately enough on their frequency without this connecting wire,
 then your objection comes primarily from a business standpoint?" Dill
 asked. Aylesworth candidly replied, "Yes, sir."40
 Earlier in the hearing, Aylesworth suggested a conspiracy was afoot. He
 accused "some of the smaller broadcasters [of staying] on the air for four or
 five hours a night asking people to write in to the Senate and to the Com-
 mission and request that all chain broadcasting be put on one wave length."
 "It is quite natural that the average honest fellow who knows nothing about
 the technical or practical side should write," he said, arguing implicitly that
 the assembled legislators should ignore their constituent correspondence in
 favor of his testimony.41 Instead of ignoring his constituents, Representative
 Davis ignored him; shortly after Aylesworth testified, Davis pressured
 Chairman Sykes to force the chains into synchronization. "In spite of the
 statements of interested engineers to the contrary," he explained, "chain pro-
 grams can be successfully broadcast on the same wavelength. It is certainly
 practical and feasible for the chain programs to be broadcast upon a very
 few wavelengths." Davis feared the commission would allow a dispropor-
 tionate number of chain affiliates to broadcast over cleared channels. To
 40. Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Federal Radio Commissioners: Hear-
 ing[s] before the Committee on Interstate Commerce, United States Senate, 70th Cong., 1st
 Sess., 1928, 224 and 289.
 41. Ibid., 285.
 103
This content downloaded from 130.111.46.54 on Tue, 07 Jun 2016 21:28:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE
 JANUARY
 2008
 VOL. 49
 remedy this, he asked the commission to impose a general "limitation on
 power to be used by chain stations," but failing that, a limitation should go
 into effect "at least when they are broadcasting chain programs."42
 Throughout the debates over synchronized broadcasting, the networks
 were strongly supported by much of the industry press. Radio Broadcast re-
 jected Commissioner CaldwelTs initial call for synchronization, arguing that
 it was unrealistic. Even the most promising system required human inter-
 vention, and "if the whole broadcasting structure depended for frequency
 stability upon manual control, it would become a sorry mess."43 A year later,
 the editors of Radio Broadcast warned that those promoting synchroniza-
 tion were feeding a false hope. Dismissing the promising results of a test
 completed by two small Virginia stations, they argued that "the conclusion
 that a demonstration over short distances will make possible long-range
 synchronization of chain stations is unwarranted" because the conditions of
 the experiment were ideal. Such variables as distance, meteorological effects,
 and signal amplification would have to be accounted for before chain broad-
 casting could be synchronized effectively.44
 At the prodding of the FRC, NBC began to seriously test synchronous
 broadcasting in late 1928. The experiments required close cooperation
 among Westinghouse, GE, NBC, and RCA engineers, as they involved sta-
 tions KDKA (Pittsburgh), WGY (Schenectady, N.Y.), and WEAF (New York
 City). Carried on outside of normal broadcast hours, these initial tests un-
 covered a few new problems to be addressed.45 The commission's subse-
 quent review called the results "unsatisfactory" because they uncovered a
 previously unknown type of heterodyne interference called "flutter inter-
 ference." This type of interference was caused by the stations' carriers being
 closely, but not exactly, synchronized. This problem could be caused by a
 variety of factors, but the most prominent included distortion of the car-
 rier wave by geophysical obstacles between the two transmitters. The key to
 avoiding flutter, according to FRC engineers, was to ensure minimal geo-
 graphic separation. When synchronization under these conditions was
 achieved in a 1929 test, the results were far more promising. When two
 5,000-watt stations located only 190 miles apart were synchronized briefly
 with the same program, they "were able to double the good-service area of
 either station alone" by eliminating those areas where heterodyne interfer-
 ence previously occurred. These results inspired Frederick Terman's vision
 42. Ewin L. Davis to E. O. Sykes, 6 April 1928, published in Second Annual Report of
 the Federal Radio Commission (n. 30 above), 134.
 43. "The Commission Suggests Synchronization Schemes," Radio Broadcast, January
 1928, 200.
 44. "The March of Radio: Will Synchronization Bring a Radio Panacea?" Radio
 Broadcast, May 1929, 8.
 45. Thomas Porter Robinson, The Radio Networks and the Federal Government (New
 York, 1943), 232.
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 of a national interlocking group system for common frequency broad-
 casting.46 Clusters of synchronized transmitters would be carefully spaced
 apart so that their wavelengths would eradicate the zones where interfer-
 ence might occur.
 In the spring of 1929, J. H. Dellinger, chief engineer of the FRC, prof-
 fered an optimistic view of the technical feasibility of a synchronous system:
 If the frequencies of stations on the same channel are maintained
 to a certain very high accuracy, the heterodyne or whistle becomes
 inaudible. The technique of frequency control is fast approaching
 this goal and success has been attained in isolated instances. Syn-
 chronization is therefore looked for as the next great advance in
 broadcasting.47
 By 1929, U.S. engineers, regulators, and listeners could point to at least two
 successful examples of synchronization: the WBZ-WBZA link, and an
 experiment conducted by WAIU in Columbus, Ohio, and KMOX in St.
 Louis in early 1928. A third could be found across the Atlantic. In the sum-
 mer of 1928, Colonel A. G. Lee, the "radio expert" of the British Post Office
 Department, visited the United States to confer with U.S. broadcasters and
 regulators. Lee discussed the successful experiments whereby the urban cen-
 ters in the United Kingdom were served by a series of low-powered (250-
 watt) synchronized transmitters, while the rural regions were offered pro-
 gramming through a 25,000-watt transmitter.48
 Acting by Dellinger's direction, the Institute of Radio Engineers' Com-
 mittee on Broadcasting (made up primarily of engineers employed by the
 networks, RCA, Westinghouse, AT&T, and the FRC) continued to promote
 synchronous-broadcasting experiments during 1930-3 1.49 The 1930 tests
 built upon the success of the 1929 experiments, which precisely was the
 problem as far as NBC was concerned. Testing occurred on the nights of 5-
 7 October 1930, between the hours of seven and eight. Under the guidance
 of C. B. Jolliffe, the newly-installed chief engineer of the FRC, and C. W.
 Horn, general engineer for NBC, for that one hour on three successive
 nights WEAF (New York City), KDKA (Pittsburgh), and WGY (Schenec-
 tady), all using the finest transmitting equipment possible, broadcast the
 46. Fourth Annual Report of the Federal Radio Commission (Washington, D.C., 1930),
 60; Terman (n. 2 above), 171-74.
 47. J. H. Dellinger, "Engineering Aspects of the Work of the Federal Radio Commis-
 sion," Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 17 (1929): 1332.
 48. "Synchronized Broadcasting," Washington Post, 27 July 1928, 6; a report submit-
 ted to the Department of Commerce by engineers at WAIU and KMOX stated that syn-
 chronization had been achieved "with an entire absence of heterodyning"; "8 Stations
 Employ Same Wave Length," Washington Post, 21 October 1928, 5. On early BBC syn-
 chronization, see also Young (n. 3 above), 438-39, and Terman, 171.
 49. "Reports of the I.R.E. Committee on Broadcasting," Proceedings of the Institute of
 Radio Engineers 18 (1930): 15-24.
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 same programs on 660 kilocycles. There was remarkable improvement over
 the 1929 tests. Heterodyne interference in overlapping regions was consid-
 erably lessened, and the general reception area for the signal was greatly
 enlarged. NBC's president was forced to admit that "the problem of syn-
 chronized transmission has been solved."50 Commenting on the test, RCA's
 chief engineer confidently predicted "that within the next few years syn-
 chronized networks will find practical application with the resulting advan-
 tage to the listener and broadcaster alike."51
 Technical success created a dilemma for NBC's top executives. In a sum-
 mary letter to the commission, Merlin Aylesworth admitted that "from a
 technical standpoint ... it is now possible to operate two or more stations
 on the same radio frequency without distortion." Yet he cautioned against
 excessive optimism: "Synchronization is a 'system' rather than any particu-
 lar apparatus." He noted that the system had to conform to the structure of
 an established industry and warned that "hasty or immature practice or ap-
 plication" of the system would be problematic. "As the stations on present
 networks are all individually owned and serve important local interests, as
 well as national programs, they cannot and should not be operated in syn-
 chronism," he concluded. While admitting "the importance of synchro-
 nization in connection with network broadcasting," Aylesworth explained
 that "the difficulties in this connection must be carefully studied." He lob-
 bied the FRC to look elsewhere for the widespread application of synchro-
 nism, writing that he was "confident the principles of synchronization can
 be satisfactorily applied to radio activities other than broadcasting, such as
 radio communications and television."52
 Despite Aylesworth's protestations, the FRC continued to encourage
 testing. The commission approved another series of synchronization tests
 involving several of the country's most important broadcast stations. These
 tests were conducted such that the stations' regular signals would not be
 affected in their primary markets and the results were closely monitored. If
 WTIC (Hartford), WEAF (New York City, the NBC Red flagship station),
 WJZ (New York City, the NBC Blue flagship station), or WBAL (Baltimore)
 complained about the experiment, it would have ended immediately.
 "These experiments," the commission concluded in its 1931 Annual Report,
 "are being observed very carefully, but as yet no general conclusions can be
 50. "Refining Broadcasting," Washington Post, 24 October 1930, 6; "NBC Admits
 Practicability of Synchronizing" (n. 3 above), 364.
 51. Alfred N. Goldsmith and Austin C. Lescarboura, This Thing Called Broadcasting
 (New York, 1930), 180. A second successful test from 1930, conducted by AT&T engi-
 neers (involving two Iowa stations), is detailed in "Synchronized Broadcasting," Science
 26(1930):xii-xiii.
 52. Merlin H. Aylesworth to General Charles McK. Saltzman, 20 October 1930, Fed-
 eral Communications Commission Papers, box 399, file 89-6, record group 173, Nation-
 al Archives II, College Park, Md.
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 drawn." Despite the reticence of the commission, the engineers involved
 informed the newspapers of both the successful transmissions and, impor-
 tantly, the lack of listener complaints received.53
 The FRC's reluctance to draw conclusions - and hence enforce syn-
 chronization - resulted not from issues of transmission, but rather recep-
 tion. The 1930 and 1931 testing isolated the most important obstacle to
 synchronizing distant, high-power stations: the contemporary transmis-
 sion antennae caused too much power to be radiated on the sky wave (as
 opposed to the ground wave). This created some reception difficulties in
 the shared bordering areas between the two stations.54 Engineers under-
 stood that phase distortion caused by time delays always represented a
 threat to the quality of a synchronized broadcast. Three factors played a
 role in ensuring quality reception of a synchronized signal: the field-inten-
 sity ratio of the carrier waves; modulation factors; and certain phase rela-
 tions between the carriers and their accompanying side-frequencies. The
 field-intensity issue involved only the middle zones, where the signal
 strengths of the two transmitters were approximately equal. The FRC stated
 that a ratio of at least four- to-one in the intensities of the two synchronized
 radio waves must be achieved to prevent distortion, but this finding was
 disputed by most contemporary engineers, who believed a ratio of two-to-
 one would suffice.55 In fact, the distortion that actually occurred in the WJZ
 and WBAL tests happened only in a very limited bordering area near Wil-
 mington, Delaware.
 To eliminate both this distortion as well as the problems caused by the
 phase relations of the side-frequencies of the carrier waves, one AT&T engi-
 neer confirmed Terman's hypothesis that any effective synchronous system
 required an increase in the "number of isochronously operated stations."
 Such an increase would both "improve markedly the satisfactoriness of the
 program received at a point distant from all the stations of the chain" and
 ensure the proper field-intensity ratios.56 This requirement for multiple
 transmitters with often overlapping signals appeared to make synchronous
 broadcasting more suited for regional, rather than national, broadcasting -
 53. Fifth Annual Report of the Federal Radio Commission (Washington, D.C., 1931),
 26-27; "New Radio Device Used without Hitch," New York Times, 17 March 1931, 37;
 "Synchronization Test Called Successful," New York Times, 2 April 1931, 33.
 54. Fifth Annual Report of the Federal Radio Commission, 28. While admitting that
 the 1930 tests demonstrated that "advanced synchronization technique has great possi-
 bilities," William Wenstrom claimed that his alternative plan for equalizing the incoming
 reflected (ground and sky wave) signals using "long-wave Superbroadcasting" would be
 more simple and economic; see Wm. H. Wenstrom, "A Plan for Making National
 Broadcast Coverage Direct," Radio News, April 1 93 1 , 878-8 1 .
 55. Robinson (n. 45 above), 233-40; K. A. Norton, "Note on Synchronization of
 Broadcast Stations WJZ and WBAL," Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 22
 (1934): 1087-89.
 56. Robinson, 239.
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 yet a national system was certainly not implausible. The experimentation
 during 1930-31 confirmed the technical practicality of such a system while
 raising the prospective costs involved (because of the additional transmit-
 ters required). An unnamed but clearly biased NBC source suggested to
 Electronics that, depending on several factors, national implementation
 could cost a network as much as $35 million in new high-power transmit-
 ter costs.57
 Despite this continued, promising testing, neither the FRC nor the
 chains nor Congress would seriously revisit the possibility of isochronous
 network broadcasting after 1931. By the time of the commission's fifth An-
 nual Report, synchronization no longer appeared to be a solution to the
 problem of a crowded radio spectrum or a tool to increase the efficiency of
 chain broadcasting. The FRC switched its emphasis from network applica-
 bility to the development of more precise transmitting equipment. The
 results of further synchronization testing taught manufacturers ways to sig-
 nificantly reduce the frequency tolerance (minor, unintended frequency
 deviation) of transmitting antennae. By the time of the FRCs sixth Annual
 Report, the technical improvements in broadcasting resulting from the
 study of synchronization were being put into practice in transmitters
 throughout the country; however, any discussion of the connection be-
 tween synchronization and network broadcasting had disappeared. In the
 commission's final report, synchronization was completely omitted.58 Once
 the commission lost interest in applying synchronization to radio net-
 works, this proposed alternative structure for U.S. network broadcasting
 would never again be seriously debated.
 Synchronization: The Lost Opportunity
 Although realistic consideration of an isochronous system ended for
 the most part by 1931, over the next several years references to synchro-
 nization continued to occasionally appear in discussions of the future of
 chain broadcasting. The commercial community's rejection of the system
 failed to deter various commentators from promoting its advantages.
 Synchronization, wrote influential radio reporter Martin Codel, "would
 57. When the FRC ordered the WBAL-WJZ testing ended in 1932, it concluded that
 "synchronous operation of broadcast stations" would be most successful in cases involv-
 ing "lower powered stations with more flexible installations and so located as to result in
 a minimum of inconvenience to radio listeners." "NBC's Synchronization Tests Ordered
 Ended by Commission," Broadcasting, 1 June 1932, 13; "NBC Admits Practicability of
 Synchronizing" (n. 3 above), 364.
 58. Fifth Annual Report of the Federal Radio Commission, 22-23; Sixth Annual Report
 of the Federal Radio Commission (Washington, D.C., 1932), 28-29; Seventh Annual Report
 of the Federal Radio Commission (Washington, D.C., 1933).
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 undoubtedly effect an economy of the all-too-scarce wave lengths. It may
 also mean the establishment of additional competing chains. The listener
 stands to benefit in any event."59 "Synchronous broadcasting, begun in
 1931, if successful, should lead to an increase in the number of stations and
 also to greater development of the chain system," W. F. Ogburn optimisti-
 cally prophesized in his 1932 report on "The Influence of Invention and
 Discovery" in Recent Social Trends in the United States: Report of the Presi-
 dent's Research Committee on Social Trends.60
 Such optimism was unfounded. By 1931, the public, political, and regu-
 latory pressure on the broadcast chains had eased significantly. While testing
 of synchronous broadcasting continued, demands that networks be syn-
 chronized on a single wavelength disappeared from the public record. By
 successfully fending off isochronous broadcasting, the networks preserved a
 system designed to maximize their profits while minimizing competition.
 Synchronous broadcasting represents a lost opportunity to democratize
 U.S. broadcasting. Considering its potential to alter the earliest debates con-
 cerning radio, it is particularly surprising that critics of the commercial sys-
 tem failed to promote its implementation. Synchronous broadcasting's abil-
 ity to provide for a more democratic use of the airwaves - while curbing the
 expansion of the networks - is completely omitted in the historical scholar-
 ship of the early radio debates. In fact, it is unclear if commercial radio's crit-
 ics were aware of synchronous broadcasting's promise. Focused almost
 entirely on commercial and cultural issues, they may have been blinded to
 technological alternatives to the status quo. Few of the prominent critics
 were engineers or physicists. James Rorty, one of the commercial system's
 most fervent adversaries, argued that spectrum scarcity required more gov-
 ernmental supervision over the airwaves - and, consequently, fewer broad-
 casting stations in America. In 1934, he called for a "re-designing of the
 broadcast system [so as to result in] a radical reduction in the number of sta-
 tions." Other reformers like Ruth Brindze believed that the American system
 could be democratized by less radical means; she used spectrum scarcity to
 call for more regulatory activism in licensing procedures. For Joy Elmer
 Morgan, another prominent critic, the only solution to combat "the threat
 against free speech in America" represented by commercial broadcasting was
 "[s]tate control."61 Yet such calls for state intervention did not unify the
 59. Martin Codel, "The Radio Structure," in Radio and Its Future, ed. Martin Codel
 (London, 1930), 22.
 60. W. F. Ogburn, with the assistance of S. C. Gilfillan, "The Influence of Invention
 and Discovery," in Recent Social Trends in the United States: Report of the President's Re-
 search Committee on Social Trends, vol. 1 (New York, 1933), 134.
 61. James Rorty, Order on the Air! (New York, 1934), 26; Ruth Brindze, Not to Be
 Broadcast (New York, 1937), 289-92; "Commercial Radio Hit as Free Speech Peril,"
 Washington Post, 13 May 1932, 3 (Morgan quote).
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 reform movement; in fact, its chief weakness lay precisely in the movement's
 lack of unity.62 That few reformers were engineers partially explains this fail-
 ure, as does the adversarial dynamic between the commercial broadcasting
 companies conducting synchronization tests and the reform movement.
 For the commercial broadcasters, the single most effective weapon in
 combating political and regulatory pressure turned out to be unrelated to
 engineering or spectrum allocation. Beginning in 1929, the popularity of
 NBC and CBS among the listening public rapidly increased. It is no coinci-
 dence that public pressure for the single-wavelength system proved most
 powerful when the chief programming fare of the chains consisted of
 music - something listeners habitually received from multiple outlets
 across the country. Once the chains began offering new genres of program-
 ming, the American listening audience responded much more enthusiasti-
 cally to their local presence. In the fall of 1929, NBC aired a series titled
 Amos V Andy that would forever change U.S. radio. Amos V Andy earned
 the highest ratings ever recorded in the history of U.S. broadcasting - it was
 truly a national phenomenon. Its primary legacy lay in the fact that it "did
 the preliminary work of conditioning listeners across the nation to follow-
 ing a continued radio program."63 Shortly after its debut, NBC developed a
 program for Fleischmann's Yeast (starring Rudy Vallee) that proved enor-
 mously popular as well. In early 1930, the network created the first regu-
 larly scheduled evening radio drama, First-Nighter, which also secured a
 wide and loyal following.64
 "There are two sides to the chain-program matter," Senator Dill ex-
 plained in an earlier debate over synchronization. "When there is a great
 program of General Motors, for instance, or when Will Rogers or Al Jolson
 and other great entertainers are on the air, every station wants to be in on
 the program" because of the public acclaim these shows bestowed upon the
 local stations.65 Public dissatisfaction with program duplication was always
 closely intertwined with audience appreciation of some chain service. By
 the end of 1930, the U.S. audience, mired in economic despair, appreciated
 weekly visits from their national radio stars. As satisfaction with network
 programming increased, complaints to Congress and the FRC declined.
 Synchronization lost its most enthusiastic proponent when Representa-
 tive Davis lost a bid for reelection in 1932. The networks also proved more
 adroit in handling the intricacies of regulation after 1929; in that year, FRC
 commissioner Sam Pickard abruptly resigned his post in order to become
 62. McChesney (n. 8 above), 261-62; see also Peter Morell, Poisons, Potions, and
 Profits: The Antidote to Radio Advertising (New York, 1937), 247-48.
 63. Francis Chase, Sound and Fury: An Informal History of Broadcasting (New York,
 1942), 181.-
 64. Harrison Summers, A Thirty-Year History of Programs Carried on National Radio
 Networks in the United States, 1926-1956 (New York, 1971 [1958]), 19-23.
 65. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2d sess., 1929, 70:3753.
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 a vice president of CBS. Pickard, who represented the zone that included
 Chicago, had been a particularly influential commissioner.66 Between 1930
 and 1934, the networks developed the remarkably harmonious relationship
 with the commission that would characterize their interaction over future
 decades.67
 In 1943, a young political scientist named Thomas Porter Robinson re-
 vived the idea of synchronous broadcasting by publishing an impressively
 detailed examination of U.S. network practice. Robinson's study relied heav-
 ily upon testimony compiled during the Federal Communications Com-
 mission's first investigation into chain-broadcasting practices conducted
 during 1938-39. He rediscovered synchronous broadcasting through the
 record of that investigation and contacted NBC's chief engineer, O. B.
 Hanson. While admitting that "synchronous network operation was feasi-
 ble," Hanson clung to the company line by concluding that "serious distor-
 tion may occur at receiving points" and that the networks should not em-
 ploy such a system until it was perfected. Robinson's review of the technical
 data effectively dismissed such concerns about reception.68
 Robinson countered Hanson's pessimism with an examination of the
 global growth of synchronous broadcasting over the previous decade. By
 the mid- 1930s, systems of isochronous network broadcasting had been
 successfully implemented in Great Britain, Germany, and Sweden. British
 technicians successfully created the first regularly scheduled wireless
 isochronous system by 1937, and throughout World War II engineers reg-
 ularly improved the system.69 Even in the United States, in 1934, an im-
 proved system that synchronized stations WBBM in Chicago and KFAB, in
 Lincoln, Nebraska (on 770 kilocycles), offered results that "far exceeded the
 predictions of the most optimistic technical experiments."70 Clearly, by
 1942, there existed no justified technical explanation for the system's rejec-
 tion in the U.S. context.
 Robinson concluded that economic considerations alone structured the
 networks' rejection of synchronization. The most serious difficulty pre-
 sented by synchronization was the elimination of so-called split-network
 sales. Before World War II, neither NBC nor CBS had much success in sell-
 ing the entirety of their chains to advertisers, who demanded "split net-
 works," or radio chains in which only desirable markets would be pur-
 66. "Capital Looms as a Center for Radio" New York Times, 17 February 1929, 130.
 67. McChesney, 20-24.
 68. Robinson (n. 45 above), 226-45; Hanson's remarks are on page 232.
 69. Fritz Morstein Marx, "State Propaganda in Germany," in Propaganda and Dicta-
 torship, ed. Harwood Lawrence Childs (Princeton, N.J., 1936), 28-30; Cesar Saerchinger,
 "Radio in Europe," Atlantic Monthly, April 1938, 512; Edward Pawley, BBC Engineering,
 1922-1972 (London, 1972), 95-96, 164-65, 245-46; Young (n. 3 above), 438-39.
 70. Young, 445; "The Present-Day Status of Broadcast Synchronizing," Electronics,
 June 1935, 174-78, 183.
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 chased and linked. This required the networks to offer additional regional
 and local programming to affiliated stations bypassed by advertisers. From
 their inception, both CBS and NBC actually produced several "networks"
 on any given day, at the behest of advertisers. While CBS and NBC offered
 impressive national radio coverage, "hardly anybody buys the whole
 works," Fortune magazine noted in 1932.71 A system of unification upon a
 single wavelength represented the destruction of this flexible economic
 model. Robinson proposed that the networks be given two national wave-
 length assignments: one broadcast would carry the commercial program,
 and the second wavelength would carry the networks' sustaining broadcast
 for the bypassed stations. Such a system would increase competition in net-
 work broadcasting - something interesting to both the FCC and the Roose-
 velt administration. "If from the economic and social standpoints synchro-
 nous network broadcasting is shown to be feasible and in the public
 interest, confidence is justified that whatever obstacles to its achievement
 exist today can be overcome," Robinson concluded.72 The broadcasting
 community ignored his argument; a critical review of his book in Broad-
 casting entirely omitted discussion of this central idea.73
 Conclusion
 For economic and regulatory reasons, synchronous broadcasting was
 simply too dangerous for the commercial community to contemplate. It
 partially resolved the U.S. system of broadcasting's essential regulatory (and
 competitive) dilemma: spectrum scarcity. In 1935, when 625 stations were
 licensed to broadcast in the United States, knowledgeable engineers esti-
 mated that synchronization could result in the accommodation of as many
 as 6,000 stations on the broadcast band.74
 The scarcity argument provided the technical rationale for the domina-
 tion of the networks. It allowed them to proclaim that their oligopoly was
 ordained by nature and made their enormous success appear innate rather
 than manufactured. "I can see the possibilities of developing systems of
 inter-communication . . . that will not depend upon wires at all," David
 Sarnoff, NBC's chairman of the board, told the FCC in 1939. "You can carry
 these signals ... by means of a radio line instead of a wire line ... by utiliz-
 ing radio relays," he explained. "When these developments are perfected, as
 I believe they will be, in time . . . you will have more technical facilities avail-
 71. "An Appraisal of Radio Advertising Today," Fortune, September 1932, 94.
 72. Robinson, 227-28.
 73. "Network Rules Attacked in New Book," Broadcasting, 14 June 1943, 16.
 74. United States Bureau of the Census, Census of Business, 1935: Radio Broadcasting
 (Washington, D.C., 1936), 2; "The Present-Day Status of Broadcast Synchronizing," 183.
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 able for use than there will be people to use them."75 These comments
 echoed his earlier statements about the future of chain broadcasting:
 I can see the day when there will be more networks possible, tech-
 nically, than people to use them. There is no reason I can see why
 there can't be a dozen, or two dozen, or several dozen national net-
 works, but in order to have them it is necessary to develop waves
 in that part of the ether which may be characterized as wasteland.76
 Sarnoff prided himself on his technical expertise; thus he was undoubtedly
 aware of synchronous broadcasting. His testimony placed isochronous
 broadcasting far in the future, therefore protecting a franchise too valuable
 to alter. By 1938, the technology existed, though the will to implement it
 had gone missing.
 75. David Sarnoff, Principles and Practices of Network Radio Broadcasting (New York,
 1939), 50.
 76. Federal Communications Commission Docket No. 5060, 8520.
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